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Abstract  
 
Using a sample of 781 U.K. firms over the period 2000-2008 we study the 
relationship between remuneration dispersion at executive board level and firm 
performance. We find that this relationship is sensitive to nationality composition of the 
executive boards. In contrast with findings on American data, British companies are 
characterized by a negative dispersion-performance relationship, i.e., the greater the 
dispersion is, the worse firm performance is, however, boards with American CEOs or at 
least 30% of American nationality non-CEO executives are characterized by a positive 
dispersion-performance relationship. The results are robust when controlling for various 
firm, board and CEO characteristics, including cross-listing on U.S. exchanges and 
having sales in the U.S. Implications for executive remuneration reforms and board 
diversity are discussed. 
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1. Introduction  
  
The literature on executive remuneration incentives is dominated by studies of 
CEO remuneration. Even when broader executive board remuneration is examined it is 
common to focus on the difference between CEO remuneration and that of specific 
board members. This focus on remuneration of CEOs is congruent with perceiving a 
CEO as a dominant personality who bears the power and responsibility for firm 
performance. However, the corporate scandals of the last decade and consequent 
corporate governance reforms undertaken by numerous regulatory bodies stress the 
importance of internally strong and cooperative boards which provide a balanced 
partnership with a CEO. Very little, however, is known about the effectiveness of 
remuneration practices at board level, especially outside the U.S. This paper steps aside 
from the tournament literature and, using U.K. data, looks at boards as teams rather than 
competitors for a CEO position. Using a non-U.S. sample opens the analysis of the 
dispersion-performance relationship to new questions. In particular, we are concerned 
with whether the U.S. boards’ characteristics transfer to U.K. boards, and how this is 
affected by the presence of American nationality executive directors.  
In recent years the role and responsibility of boards has been more hotly 
discussed than ever before. Numerous corporate scandals have highlighted the 
importance of strong, well-informed and independent boards that fulfill their governing, 
advisory and monitoring roles (e.g., Coffee, 2002; Healy and Palepu, 2003; Melis, 
2005; de Jong et al., 2007). While considerable attention has been paid to introducing 
structural changes which lead to the reduction of CEOs’ power and dominance (e.g., 
separation of CEO and Chair position), the empowerment of non-executive directors 
(e.g., creation of non-executive Chairs, independent directors), etc., relatively little 
attention is paid to financial incentives at the board level. Indeed, it is a CEO’s 
remuneration that initiates political debate2 and shareholder protests3. It is common in 
the academic literature to treat boards as if they were waiting rooms full of executives 
determined to be the next CEO, e.g., it is common to test whether there are signs of 
                                               
2 E.g., see “Labour urges ‘responsible capitalism’ in executive pay”, David Batty, The Guardian, 7 
January 2012; “We’ll rein in executive pay, vows David Cameron”, Tom Ross, The Telegraph, 7 January 
2012; “Ed Miliband has been pick-pocketed by David Cameron on executive pay. Has he noticed yet?” 
Dan Hodges, The Telegraph, 9 January 2012. 
3 E.g., see “Shareholder revolt set to continue with investors ready to vote against pay deals at William 
Hill, Unilever and WPP”, This is Money Reporter, May 6, 2012; “Investors rebuke Citi board over pay”, 
T Braithwaite and D. McCrum, Financial Times, April 18, 2012. Also see Kuhnen and Niessen (2012). 
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executive tournaments and how they impact on performance (Main et al., 1993; Ang et 
al., 1998; Eriksson, 1999; Bognanno, 2001; Conyon and Sadler, 2001; Conyon et al. 
2001, Kale et al., 2009; Rankin and Sayre, 2011; Burns et al., 2012). Lee et al. (2008) is 
the only study we are aware of that explicitly studies the relationship between 
remuneration dispersion at a board level and firm performance.  Using U.S. data Lee et 
al. (2008) find that the bigger dispersion is, the better firm performance is. The 
tournament literature finds that the bigger pay differential between a CEO and other 
executive board members is, then the better firm performance is. Taking this together it 
raises the question of whether the positive relationship between remuneration dispersion 
and firm performance is a universal characteristic of boards or not.   
For instance, if boards are not strongly hierarchical and the division of work and 
responsibilities tends to be balanced, then it could be that large remuneration differences 
among board members, hence high remuneration dispersion, impacts negatively on the 
team spirit and motivation. Consequently, such boards could be characterized by a 
negative dispersion-performance relationship. This would be consistent with theoretical 
studies (Akerlof and Yellen, 1988; Milgrom and Roberts, 1988; Lazear, 1989; Akerlof 
and Yellen, 1990) and empirical research on cooperation in general economic situations 
(Pfeffer and Langton, 1993; Drago and Garvey, 1998; Lindquist, 2010; van den Assem 
et al., 2012). 
Understanding the dispersion-performance relationship at board level is 
important for several reasons. First, if corporate governance reforms are to succeed it is 
vital to fully understand board dynamics. There is no point to work hard to improve the 
board architecture if remuneration practices hamper, and even prevent, cooperation 
among board members. Second, if the dispersion-performance relationship is not 
universally positive, then the answer to the question of how to determine the 
remuneration structure that should be in place is even more complicated than currently 
acknowledged. If reward systems and practices are determined by cultural attitudes and 
values, as Pennings (1993) argues, it may be that it is fruitless to search for universal 
solutions, and studies of remuneration incentives should be done at a cultural, or at least 
country, level. Third, if the dispersion-performance relationship is not universally 
positive, the issue of how to remunerate culturally diverse boards emerges. This issue is 
particularly important in the modern era of business globalization. Indeed, given high 
labor mobility, companies do not have to expand businesses to foreign markets to find 
themselves facing issues of how to structure the remuneration of multicultural boards. 
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 This paper studies the dispersion-performance relationship using a sample of 
781 British companies listed on the London Stock Exchange in the period 2000-2008 
to assess to what extent the American findings of the positive relationship are 
universal and robust. U.K. boards provide particularly interesting material for such an 
investigation. On one hand, the U.S. and the U.K. are commonly perceived as the core 
of the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system, and therefore, one may expect that 
U.S. and U.K. boards are characterized by similar features. On the other hand, the 
countries are quite different culturally,4 and a deeper analysis of their board structures 
and practices indicates substantial differences in their corporate architecture, with the 
U.K. being less ‘linear’ and less CEO-centered (e.g., Toms and Wright, 2005; 
Aguilera et al., 2006). Consequently, one could conjecture that British boards may not 
be characterized by a positive dispersion-performance relationship, i.e., the American 
findings do not carry over to the British sample. If this is the case, however, one could 
also ask what the dispersion-performance relationship is when American executives sit 
on British boards. Given that the past literature documents that American boards are 
characterized by a positive dispersion-performance relationship we test whether the 
presence of American executives on British boards is still associated with a positive 
dispersion-performance relationship. If yes, this would support Newman and Nollen’s 
(1996) argument that practices that are aligned with national culture lead to better 
performance.  
Controlling for various firm and board characteristics we find strong evidence of 
a negative dispersion-performance relationship on British boards. This result is further 
strengthened when the analysis is restricted to companies which do not have any 
overseas executives. We also find that the presence of American executives is 
associated with the change of the sign of the dispersion-performance relationship. In 
particular, we find that boards which have at least 30% of executives of American 
nationality are characterized by the positive dispersion-performance relationship. 
This research contributes to the existing literature on the link between executive 
remuneration and performance, and on board diversification issues in several ways. 
First, it enriches our understanding of the relationship between pay differentials within 
an executive board and firm performance. This is the first study that documents that the 
                                               
4 For instance, Geert Hofstede™ Cultural Dimensions show that the Power Distance Index, that is the 
extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions accept and expect that power 
is distributed unequally, puts the UK on the same level as Germany, with the value of the index at 35, 
while the US scores 40.   
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relationship may be negative, and that it is related to cultural characteristics of 
executives (in our case – nationality) rather than to the country of origin of the 
company.  Second, it adds to our understanding of potential costs and benefits of board 
diversity.  The fact that the effectiveness of remuneration incentives may be strongly 
affected by individuals’ culturally shaped attitudes towards how they and others are 
financially rewarded adds an additional complication to the, already complex, issue of 
structuring executive boards incentives.  
The fact that remuneration dispersion may impact negatively on firm 
performance has strong implications for the on-going debate on how to reform 
executive remuneration so that it provides the right incentives. It highlights the 
importance of treating remuneration incentives as a board-level, and not a CEO-level, 
issue. Even if an optimal structure of CEO remuneration can be found and implemented, 
it does not guarantee that it will result in superior firm performance as it may antagonize 
the other board members. As the reforms of corporate governance head towards 
empowering boards and increasing their responsibility for companies’ operations, 
strategy, performance, etc., the reforms of restructuring executive remuneration must 
not be narrowed down to CEO’s compensation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature 
review and structures hypotheses. Section 3 provides description of the data, defines 
variables and discusses estimation issues. Section 4 presents the results of the regression 
analysis and Section 5 closes with conclusions. 
    
  
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 
2.1. Remuneration Incentives and Firm Performance 
 
Group management is a complex task and executive boards are no exception.  
The case of boards is additionally complicated by the fact that boards’ behavior is 
potentially burdened with agency problems, i.e., boards as the minority acting on behalf 
of a big and often dispersed group of shareholders may have their own objectives to 
pursue. Therefore, the relationship between executive compensation and firm 
performance can be perceived as a mechanism to reduce agency problems (e.g., 
Holmström, 1979) or, alternatively it is the result of agency problems (Bebchuk and 
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Fried, 2003, 2004). Numerous papers have been written on the subject of how to 
remunerate CEOs (e.g., Core et al., 2003; Jensen et al., 2004; Bebchuk and Weisbach, 
2010 for surveys) while relatively less attention is paid to structuring remuneration of 
non-CEO executives (see Gerhart et al., 2009 for a review). The debate on executive 
remuneration is frequently built on the theoretical work of Mahoney (1978) and Lazear 
and Rosen (1981), and concentrates on testing whether tournaments and rivalry 
introduced through big remuneration differences between a CEO and non-CEO 
executives is associated with better firm performance. While there is broad evidence 
that in many economic settings cooperation and collaboration are important (Bloom, 
1999; Pfeffer and Langton, 1993; Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta, 2010; Lindquist, 
2010), the tournament hypothesis, designed on the ‘winner takes it all’ attitude of sport 
competitions (Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990; Becker and Huselid, 1992), has found 
support in numerous studies using executive boards’ data. In line with the tournament 
argument it has been found that big remuneration differences between a CEO and 
his/her potential within-the-board replacements (vice-presidents, the three or five best 
paid executives, etc.) are positively associated with firm performance (Main et al., 1993; 
Bognanno, 2001; Henderson and Fredrickson, 2001; DeVaro, 2006a, 2006b; Kale et al., 
2009; Rankin and Sayre, 2011). Moreover, Lee et al. (2008) show that stepping aside 
from board hierarchies preserves the result, i.e., they find that large remuneration 
dispersion within a board also positively impacts on performance. Admittedly, all these 
studies are based on U.S. data and are in agreement with the fact that traditionally U.S. 
boards are highly hierarchical and centered around a powerful CEO.  
  However, given that the U.S. model and culture of corporate governance is not 
universal, it would be premature to conclude that the positive dispersion-performance 
relationship has a universal, i.e., cross-national or cross-cultural, character.5 There seem 
to exist substantial variations among nations in their sensitivity to social inequality, 
individualism, and fairness (Hofstede, 1980, 1983; House et al., 2004; Tosi and 
Greckhamer 2004). Moreover, as cultural differences may have played a significant role 
in determining financial market structures, organizational structures and governance 
(Kerr and Slocum 2005, Kwock and Tadesse 2006), they may also have impacted on the 
perception of leadership roles and responsibilities (Pillai et. al. 1999) and creation of 
remuneration practices (Schuler and Rogovski 1998). Consequently, it can be expected 
                                               
5 We step aside from a debate on cultural differences within one country and across counties. For 
simplicity of argument we treat countries as culturally homogeneous.     
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that there may be many distinct remuneration practices and that the differences among 
them may be big enough for remuneration practices that work well in one country to fail 
to deliver good results in another. Given that the acceptance of hierarchies is associated 
with acceptance of remuneration disparities (e.g., Tosi and Greckhamer 2004, Kerr and 
Slocum 2005) an absence of a positive dispersion-performance relationship could arise 
in countries with governance structures and business cultures less hierarchical and less 
CEO dominated than the U.S. one.   
The non-US studies, and there is only a handful of them, focus on direct 
comparison of remuneration of CEOs with that of selected executive directors, i.e., they 
concentrate on testing for tournament (Ang et al., 1998; Eriksson 1999; Conyon and 
Sadler, 2001; Conyon et al., 2001). None of these papers analyses the link between 
board dispersion and firm performance, which is of direct relevance for this research, 
but even so, these studies indicate that the American findings may not have a universal 
character. In brief, these studies have only a “varying degree of success” in confirming 
the American findings of the positive association of tournaments on performance. For 
instance, although it is not altogether clear that the approach of Conyon et al. (2001) is 
informative about a wide range of UK companies (they use one or two year snapshots of 
companies from the FTSE 100 index that have divisional directors, do not control for 
endogeneity, etc.), the fact that the positive relationship between the remuneration 
differences and performance is not uniformly found for the sample of the biggest 
companies suggests that the U.K. attitudes towards remuneration dispersion may differ 
from that documented for the U.S. companies.  
  
 
2.2 U.S. versus U.K. boards  
 
Given that the U.S. and the U.K. are perceived as the core of the Anglo-Saxon 
corporate governance system it is more common to focus on their similarities (e.g., 
unitary boards) rather than differences (e.g., shareholder rights, separation of CEO and 
Chair, protection against hostile takeovers). However, there are substantial differences 
in the architecture of the American and of the British boards, and in particular, in how 
power is shared between a CEO and a board.  
It is traditional in the U.S. that CEOs chair their boards and a situation where 
this is not the case is treated as temporary and “some sort of probation” (Kale et al., 
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2009). Morgan et al. (2011) document that U.S. mutual funds support only 34% of 
shareholder proposals calling for separation of CEO and Board Chairman positions 
although their support of shareholders’ proposals to declassify boards is 90%.6 The 
tradition to have CEOs chairing their boards is so well rooted, that the action of the 
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) pension 
fund to separate the position of CEO and chairman in nine leading financial institutions 
and in some large non-financial companies undertaken in 2012 faced strong resistance. 
After many months of battling none of the companies targeted has separated the CEO 
and chairman positions. Only Goldman Sachs has made conciliatory changes, agreeing 
to appoint an independent lead director7, and even here the agreement has aroused 
significant discontent.8 Interestingly, all this has been happening after, in 2010, 
Congress passed three proposals calling for separation of the roles of the CEO and the 
Board Chair.   
In Britain, on the other hand, CEOs are not so powerful (Higgs, 2003; Aguilera, 
2005; Aguilera et al., 2006). One of the main recommendations of the Cadbury’s Report 
(1992) was a clear division of responsibilities on British boards, i.e., that the position of 
chairman of the board is separated from that of CEO, or that there is a strong 
independent element on the board, e.g., if a CEO is a chair there should be a senior non-
executive director to whom non-executive directors may report their concerns. Over the 
last decade there have been three high profile cases combining the positions of CEO and 
chair of the board.9 On each occasion there was front page coverage in the business 
press focused on the widespread concern and significant negative response to the 
actions.10  In the case of Stuart Rose, the CEO of Marks & Spencer, the combination of 
roles was temporary (with an explicit maximum term) yet over 20% of investors still 
abstained or voted against his election as Executive Chairman. Indeed, resistance to 
separate the CEO and Chair is not only perceived as bad corporate governance practice 
but as a clear sign of “Americanization”. “It is hard to see Carnival as anything other 
than American company” was a summary Carnival (the cruise line and a FTSE 100 
                                               
6 This aversion towards having a CEO who does not chair the board seems to be supported by better 
performance of firms that have CEOs as Chairs than those that have separated the positions, e.g., Brickley 
et al. (1997), Bloom and Van Reenen (2010), Dey et al. (2011),  Byrd et al. (2012) to mention just a few. 
7 “Goldman’s deal with union: something for someone”, Router, Boston/New York, 28 March 2012 
8“Union disapproves of Goldman’s choice for lead director”, The Wall Street Journal, 4 April 2012 
9 E.g., Sir Stuart Rose of Marks and Spencer, Michael Grade of  ITV and Graham Mackay of SAB Miller. 
10“What's wrong with being executive chairman?”, The Guardian, 12March 2008; “ITV weighs cost of 
executive combination”, The Financial Times, London, 30 September 2009; “SAB Miller Chief Graham 
Mackay to become Chairman”, The Telegraph, 23 April 2012 
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blue-chip company) received in response to its persistence to have the same person, 
Micky Arison, holding both the CEO and the Chair posts.11 Higgs (2003) reports that 
only 19% of U.S. firms have CEOs who do not chair their boards, whereas 90% of U.K. 
companies have separate CEOs and chairs.12 
A difference in how the Americans and the British see the top executives is even 
expressed in such a supposedly trivial thing as how a CEO is referred to. The U.S. 
terminology of CEO (Chief Executive Officer) has an element of power and military 
whereas the traditional U.K. nomenclature of Managing Director indicates a less 
dominant and less power-based position.  While in the U.S. “CEO control and the 
authoritarianism it breeds are probably the only way to run an enterprise successfully” 
(Greenspan, cited in the Financial Times, 13 March 2008), the U.K. attitudes are quite 
opposite. A ‘one man show’ style of U.S. does not seem to suit U.K. boards which 
prefer quiet diplomacy, effectiveness and tradition for succession (Black and Coffee, 
1994; Holland, 1998). Moreover, Toms and Wright (2005) argue that British managers 
“were reluctant to adopt professional managerial hierarchies” so characteristic for 
American boards. Allyson Stewart-Allen, an international marketing and strategy 
consultant and author of the book “Working with Americans” (Stewart-Allen and 
Denslow, 2002), stresses that British businessmen are “less procedural”, not so “linear” 
in pursuing their objectives, and find the “impersonal element (of the way Americans do 
business) slightly uncomfortable and not necessary very rewarding”. She also stresses 
that “for the British executives, success doesn't always looks like money and cash in the 
bank in the way like it does for the American. Success in the UK looks like knowledge, 
looks like network of contacts, look(s) like numbers of years you work for a company”, 
and that in “the US where it’s actually more about my individual performance and 
looking after me, whereas in the UK it’s about looking after my company, and team as 
well as me”.13 
The hierarchic structure of U.S. boards is also expressed in a clear separation of 
various “tiers” of executives, e.g., vice-president.  In contrast, this practice is rare on 
British boards, and indeed, it is quite common that annual reports do not specify 
                                               
11“British governance on itinerary for Carnival investors?”, Financial Times, London, 13 March 2008.   
12 After in 2010 Congress introduced three proposals to limit CEO duality, the proportion of U.S, firms 
with CEOs not chairing their boards increased to about 50%. This is still far below the U.K. statistics and 
occurred after our sample ends.  
13 Allyson Stewart-Allen, “Working with the British”, http:///www.videojug.com/interview/working-with-
the-british 
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positions of individual executive members at all. Instead, executive directors are simply 
referred to as “executives”.  
 Therefore, given that U.K. corporate boards’ mechanisms and structures are less 
individualistic, it may be expected that these attitudes will be reflected in how within-
board remuneration dispersion motivates board members.  Given that large 
remuneration gaps may be a sign of hierarchy, dominance and inflated self-importance 
(Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1992), and that “the reward system (…) is an unequivocal 
statement of the corporation’s values and beliefs” (Kerr and Slocum, 2005), large 
remuneration dispersion may not have the same stimulation effect on British executives 
as it has on their American colleagues.  Indeed, we hypothesize that British boards may 
be more effective when pay dispersion is low, i.e., we predict a negative dispersion-
performance relationship.  
This hypothesis is consistent with numerous theoretical arguments stressing the 
importance and benefits of group unity and integrity, and, in particular, that 
remuneration dispersion negatively impacts on the evolution of group cohesion and 
integration, as well as motivation to exert effort and work hard (Mohoney, 1979; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1988; Lazear, 1989; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Drago and 
Garvey, 1998). Also theories of social fairness argue against high remuneration 
disparities, following the argument that agents are sensitive to how much they are 
rewarded as individuals, as well as how their remuneration compares against 
remuneration of others (e.g., Adams, 1965; Crosby, 1984).  
However, given that the positive relationship between firm performance and 
remuneration disparities among individual executive board members and within a board 
are documented for U.S. boards (e.g., Main et al., 1993;  Bognanno, 2001;  Lee et al., 
2008; Kale et al., 2009; Rankin and Sayre, 2011), and “…financial performance is 
higher when management practices in the work unit are congruent with national culture” 
(Newman and Nollen, 1996), a natural question arises of what is the dispersion-
performance relationship when  American executives sit on British boards? Adler and 
Graham (1989) show that among the studied groups (i.e., American, Canadian and 
Japanese businessmen) the Americans were “the most obstinate” in the sense that “their 
behavior remained consistent across situations”. In light of this and of the past literature 
documenting the positive dispersion-performance relationship on U.S. boards, one can 
expect that large, rather than small, remuneration dispersion creates positive incentives 
for Americans, and the fact that they work on British boards should not reverse this 
11 
 
relationship. Therefore, even if the negative dispersion-performance relationship 
characterizes British boards, the presence of American executives can be expected to be 
associated with the positive dispersion-performance relationship.14  
American values and, in particular, the positive dispersion-performance 
relationship may characterize other nations and business cultures. However, the sample 
we have does not allow testing for the sign of the dispersion-performance relationship 
for other nationalities. There is simply not enough representation of other nationalities 
other than U.S. on British boards to control for them without running into the problem 
of individual specific effects. 
 
 
3. Data and Methodology  
 
The data have been collected from numerous sources. The information about 
characteristics of individual members of boards (nationality, tenure, age, current 
position, etc.) as well as annual remuneration have been collected from BoardEx. 
However, given that BoardEx’s data have numerous missing observations (e.g, 
nationality), individuals were cross-searched on www.semantric.com, 
www.linkedin.com and Bloomberg Businessweek (www.investing.businessweek.com) 
in order to fill in the gaps. 
From Datastream/Worldscope we collected the accounting and stock market 
data necessary to calculate performance measures and control for firm characteristics. 
Thomson One Banker was the source of information on insider share ownership. 
Information on cross-listing in the U.S. was collected from annual reports of the U.S. 
stock exchanges, BNY Mellon (www.adrbnymellon.com) and via a general web search. 
Information on whether companies had sales in the U.S. was collected from 
www.hemscott.com and annual company reports.  
The sample consists of 781 U.K. companies publicly traded on the London 
Stock Exchange over the period 2000-2008. These are non-financial and non-utility 
firms for which there is information for at least two years, for at least three executive 
                                               
14 We use the presence of Americans as an indicator of the existence of processes which are American 
specific. The data at hand do not allow for an in-depth analysis of whether it is the presence of large 
remuneration dispersion that attracts American executives or whether, once Americans join the board, the 
dispersion increases as a result of the company adopting American ways of doing business. However, 
Section 4.3 provides some basic analysis which indicate that it is the latter. 
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board members and  the company has a CEO (i.e., it was not in process of appointing a 
new leader). 217 out of these 781 companies (i.e., 28%) have at least one foreign 
executive board member. Among those, 106 companies (14%) have at least one 
American executive of which 37 have an American CEO. There also are 142 companies 
(18%) with at least one a non-American overseas executive. Of these, Canadians and 
Irish are the most numerous groups among CEOs. There are eight of each of them. In 
total, there are 70 non-American overseas CEOs spread across 22 nationalities. 
  In the analysis we use the whole sample of 781 companies, a sub-sample of 
564 companies where all board members are British (later referred to as the All-British-
Boards sample), as well as the sample of 217 companies with overseas executives (later 
referred to as the Foreigners-on-Boards sample). For each of the samples a series of 
dependent and independent variables are defined below. The summary statistics of these 
variables are presented in Table 1. 
 
*************** insert Table 1 here **************** 
 
 
3.1. Dependent Variables 
 
Performance of companies is measured by shareholder returns (Returns) and return 
on capital employed (ROCE).  We use the shareholder returns because boards are 
contractually bound to act on behalf of shareholders, and therefore to maximize the 
shareholder value. ROCE, on the other hand, as a financial ratio “act(s) as a potential 
signal of managerial effort” (Conyon, 2000) and allows comparison of our results with 
the earlier U.K. studies (Conyon and Sadler, 2001). It is also worth mentioning that 
ROCE is the measure used in the U.K. by the Competition Commission to assess firm 
performance.15 
Using ROCE is straightforward, because the timing of its reporting is consistent 
with the timing of the other corporate governance and remuneration data. However, 
because the month of publication of the reports differ across companies, i.e., some 
companies publish their reports in January, some in February, etc., the corresponding 
                                               
15 We have also used return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Given that ROCE, ROA, and 
ROE are highly correlated (above 70%), the results obtained for ROA and ROE are consistent with these 
presented in the paper. To save space we do not report them.   
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stock market performance must be calculated to match the period covered by the 
financial performance and corporate governance data.   We calculate Returns as the 
annual log-return of dividend adjusted share prices for a year ending a month before the 
annual report is published, i.e., if an annual report is published in March 2007, the 
corresponding stock market performance is calculated between March 2006 and 
February 2007. We believe that in this way we closely match the period the accounting 
data are calculated for (given that preparation of the final report takes some time).  
Table 1 shows that the companies with overseas executives are slightly more 
profitable than the companies without overseas executives.  The average ROCE for the 
former group is 7.82%, while for the latter one it is 5.67%. There is practically no 
difference in the mean stock market returns between the two sub-samples, although the 
range of stock market returns of the All-British-Boards sample is wider than it is in the 
case of the Foreigners-on-Boards sample.  
 
3.2. Independent Variables  
 
Dispersion  
The tournament literature uses the difference in remuneration between a CEO 
and some selected executive directors (e.g., Eriksson 1999; Bognano 2001; DeVaro, 
2006, Kale et. al., 2009) to assess the impact of pay differences on firm performance. 
This approach does not help to address board-level remuneration issues even if it is 
suitable to assess monetary gains from promotions. This is because it explicitly focuses 
on a CEO and ignores some, potentially important from the perspective of board 
dynamics, executives.  
To analyze the impact of within-board pay differentials a measure that captures 
dispersion across all board members is needed. Standard deviation of remuneration 
seems an appropriate measure but it is sensitive to the size of remuneration included in 
the calculations. The size of remuneration may correlate with the firm size, and hence, 
with board size and other board and firm characteristics, which will cause econometric 
issues and create difficulties in interpretation of the results. Normalization of the 
standard deviation of remuneration within the board by the mean remuneration avoids 
the problem. Therefore, we define Dispersion as the standard deviation of all executive 
remunerations divided by the mean executive remuneration (see also Lee et al., 2008). 
This measure is more representative for boards as a whole and more informative than a 
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comparison of CEOs’ remuneration against remuneration of those potentially ‘in-line’ 
for promotion, especially since those potentially contesting for an internal promotion are 
unknown. It also side steps hierarchies. For example, in U.S. based studies it is 
relatively straightforward to layer executives, because it is clear who, e.g., vice-
presidents are. The U.K. boards do not have such hierarchies, and introducing it by 
focusing on artificially created groups of importance may not reflect the true allocation 
of power and hence bias the results.16  
The normalized standard deviation is also insensitive to proportionate changes in 
remuneration. If a CEO and some executive director are rewarded, say, with a 50% 
increase in remuneration, then the difference between their pays would increase if 
initially the CEO was paid more than the executive used for comparison. However, the 
proportionate increases in pay have no impact on dispersion calculated as the 
normalized standard deviation of the CEO’s and the executive’s compensation. Using 
the ‘normalized’ dispersion also has the benefit that it is congruent with the notion that 
the relativity of earnings not their absolute levels are more detrimental for the 
development of unfair treatment feelings (Easterlin, 1995; Wade et al. 2006).17  
There is one more issue that requires addressing. It has been widely 
acknowledge in the literature that studying the impact of remuneration on performance 
suffers from reverse causality.  Good performance may affect remuneration via two 
channels: (i) via financial rewards (e.g., bonuses being granted if a company performs 
well) and/or (ii) via performance-linked incentives (i.e., good stock market performance 
increases value of options and shares).  Studies that use the nominal difference between 
remuneration of a CEO and of some selected executives are also exposed to the reverse 
causality issue because it is common for CEOs’ remuneration to contain a higher 
proportion of equity-linked compensation than remuneration of the other executive 
board members. Moreover, remuneration practices that favor a CEO when bonuses are 
being awarded, i.e., when CEOs ‘scoop the cream’, may also increase dispersion when a 
CEO is compared against his/her executive peers.  Consequently, if dispersion is 
measured in relation to a CEO, i.e., as the difference between his/her earnings and of 
some of his/her executive colleagues, then reverse causality is an issue.  
                                               
16 For instant, Conyon and Sadler (2001) use divisional directors to proxy for the first tier executives on 
U.K. boards. This reduces an analysis to a small sample of companies who have divisional directors.      
17 Note that if a board consisted of a CEO and another director, and both of them received 50% increase 
in pay because of good performance the difference of the remunerations would increase if the CEO was 
paid more than the  other director. However, the normalised standard deviation of their remunerations 
would remain unchanged. 
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Reverse causality is however not a problem in our case because the way 
dispersion is calculated (i.e., across all executives and as the normalized standard 
deviation) dilutes the effects of automatic increases of remuneration disparities, and also 
because a negative dispersion-performance relationship is expected, and later confirmed 
by the evidence. For good performance to cause decreased dispersion rather than the 
other way round (i.e., for there to be a reverse causality problem), good performance 
would have to result in the remuneration of less well paid executives increasing 
proportionately more than the remuneration of better paid executives. This is, however, 
counterintuitive, because it is unlikely that the proportion of equity linked remuneration 
of the better paid executives is lower than of those paid less.  
To gain a good understanding of the impact of dispersion on performance, in 
addition to Dispersiontotal-pay, defined as the standard deviation of total remuneration of 
executive board members normalized by the mean executive total remuneration, 
Dispersionsalary, defined as the standard deviation of salaries of executive board 
members normalized by the mean executive salary is used.18 Given that contracts that 
define the size of salary tend not to change on an annual basis and that salary is that 
component of remuneration which does not automatically change with performance, 
Dispersionsalary is more a board characteristic, or a proxy for remuneration practices, 
rather than a volatile measure driven by stock market fluctuations. In addition, one 
could argue that differences in salaries may be particularly informative about the role 
remuneration differentials pay in motivating executives. This is because stronger 
feelings about unfairness of pay may result from differences in salaries as the size of 
this part of compensation tends not to be effort driven. Finally, the fact that 25% of 
CEOs in our sample do not have equity linked compensation makes Dispersionsalary a 
relevant measure in assessing the effectiveness of remuneration practices on U.K. 
boards. Finally, to make absolutely sure that our results are not affected by reverse 
causality we take a lag of Dispersion.   
To close the discussion we calculate correlations between the lagged dispersion 
measures and the performance measures, and between the dispersion measures and the 
lagged performance measures.19 All the correlations between lagged Dispersions and 
the performance measures are statistically significant at 1% save for those between 
                                               
18 Total remuneration is defined as a sum of salary, equity linked compensation, pension contributions, 
and other payments, which include medical care, value of car, fuel, club membership, etc..  
19 Given the data at hand it is impossible to conduct the formal Granger causality test. 
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ROCE and the lagged Dispersiontotal-pay which is statistically significant at 10%. None of 
the correlations calculated for the lagged performance measures and Dispersion are 
significant. This suggests that if there is causality, it is more likely to be from 
Dispersion to performance than the other way round, and this applies to both measure of 
Dispersion. For this reason in all the regressions we use the first lag of the dispersion 
measures.  
Table 1 shows that, as expected, Dispersiontotal-pay is slightly larger than 
Dispersionsalary. Its standard deviation is also higher.  Moreover, larger Dispersion is 
observed in companies with overseas executives than in companies with all British 
nationality executives.   
 
Nationality of Executives  
Testing for the dispersion-performance relationship on boards with American 
nationality executives is one of the objectives of the paper. Therefore it is important to 
properly control for the presence of American and overseas executives to ensure that the 
effects observed are not diluted or enforced by the presence of other than U.S. 
nationality executives. Out of 106 companies with U.S. nationality executives 37 
companies have a U.S. nationality CEO and 80 companies have U.S. nationality non-
CEO executives. In the case of the 142 companies which have non-U.S. overseas 
executives 70 companies have non-U.S. overseas CEOs. These non-U.S. nationality 
CEOs are spread across 22 nationalities with no nationality coming close to the U.S. 
figures. Canadians and Irish are the next most numerous (eight of each), followed by 
South Africans and French (seven of each). This means that although the group of 
companies with U.S. CEOs should be numerous enough to dilute individual effects, the 
other nationalities are not numerous enough to allow for a meaningful testing of their 
potential impact. Therefore, while we explicitly separate the U.S. nationality executives, 
all the other nationalities are pooled together in one group. We also separate CEOs from 
the other executive board members to gain some understanding of the significance of 
having American nationality executives at the leader level. This separation is adopted to 
gain further insight into the importance of CEOs for the dispersion-performance 
relationship, given that CEOs are typically dominant figures on boards of American 
companies.  
Therefore, the following five variables, which are interacted with both measures 
of dispersion, are calculated: US-execs% is the ratio of American nationality executives 
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to the total number of executives; US-board% is the ratio of the number of American 
nationality executives other than a CEO to the total number of executives minus a CEO; 
Non-US/UKboard% is the ratio of the number of overseas non-American nationality 
executives other than CEO to the total number of executives minus the CEO; US-CEO 
is a dummy equal to one if a CEO is of American nationality and zero otherwise, and, 
finally, Non-US/UK-CEO is a  dummy equal to one if a CEO is neither British nor 
American, and zero otherwise.  
 
 
3.3. Control Variables 
 
Because we are interested in isolating the impact of remuneration dispersion on firm 
performance we control for several firm and board characteristics which are well 
documented in the literature to be associated with firm performance. 
 
Firm characteristics 
Following the existing literature we control for firm size, Firm-size, which is 
measured by the natural logarithm of net revenues (sales) expressed in millions of 
pounds sterling.20 Leverage, defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets, controls for 
a firm’s financial liquidity. High leverage is typically perceived as a sign of financial 
distress so a negative relationship between performance and leverage is expected. Given 
that one of our dependent variables is ROCE, it may be particularly important to control 
for non-physical capital, i.e., intangible assets. To proxy for intangible assets, we 
calculate a ratio of the value of assets not having physical existence (DataStream code 
02649) to total assets. 21  It is further denoted as Intangibles. We also control for insider 
ownership, Insiders, defined as the fraction of outstanding shares held by insiders (i.e., 
directors, officers, immediate families, any other corporate individuals).22 As agency 
problems arise from the separation of management and control, the higher the share-
                                               
20 We have also used the number of employees and its lag to proxy for firm size. Given that it did not 
have any impact on the main results we do not present these regressions to save space.  
21 According to the DataStream definition these non-physical assets include goodwill/cost of excess of net 
assets purchased, patents, copyrights, trademarks, formulae, etc. We do not use R&D because DataStream 
provides the R&D data for about a quarter of our sample only.  
22 It is also common to control for institutional ownership. However, in our sample institutional 
ownership and insider ownership are highly correlated. It was not econometrically sound to use them in 
one regression specification. We use the insider ownership as it was deliver better fit. 
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ownership of the executives is, then the higher their alignment with shareholders can be 
expected, therefore a positive sign for Insiders should be expected (e.g., Palia and 
Lichtenberg, 1999; Singh and Davidson, 2003).  
Table 1 shows that the All-British-Boards companies are on average slightly smaller 
than the companies with overseas executives. The mean size of the companies without 
overseas executives is 11.89 (i.e., 146,093mln pound sterling), while those with the 
foreign executives is 13.36 (i.e., 634,124mln pound sterling). The insider ownership is 
slightly higher on the All-British Boards firms, 26.6%, than on the Foreigners-on-
Boards firms, 20.9%. However the average leverages of both samples are comparable 
(about 22-23%), and so are the ratios of intangible assets to total assets (about 19%).  
It could be the case that what we attribute to the presence of American executives, in 
fact, reflects more general ‘culture’ of the given company.  That is, there are companies 
that have, for example, more hierarchical board architecture than other companies, and 
these more hierarchical companies attract American executives. If this is true that 
historically U.K. boards are less hierarchical, and only some companies have adopted 
higher hierarchies (and this is not the presence of American executives that causes it), it 
is reasonable to assume that it could happen via exposure to more hierarchical 
structures, and, in our case, via the exposure to the U.S. corporate culture and practices. 
This exposure might happen in many ways, but it is reasonable to suppose that having 
extensive business contacts with the U.S. market could create an appropriate base for 
adopting American ways of doing business. Therefore, to check the robustness of our 
findings we test whether controlling for firm’s exposure to the U.S. market impacts on 
the results. For this purpose we construct two dummies: US-listed, which  is equal to 
one if a company was cross-listed on one of the US stock exchanges in a given reporting 
year, and US-sales, which is equal to one if a company had sales in the USA and zero 
otherwise in  a given reporting year.23 These two dummies are also interacted with the 
dispersion measures.   
 
Board and CEO characteristics 
Several board and CEO characteristics found to be related to performance are also 
controlled for. The size of a board, Board-size, is defined as the total number of 
executive (including CEO) and non-executive directors sitting on a board. The 
                                               
23 We do not control for the proportion of sales in the U.S. to total sales because this information was 
available for a small fraction of the companies only.  
19 
 
relationship between Board-size and the performance is not clear, although it can be 
expected to be negative rather than positive. This is because, on one hand, bigger 
boards, having more man-power and expertise, may be able to draw on a variety of 
perspectives on corporate strategy (Forbes and Milliken, 1999), but on the other hand, 
they may be more difficult to coordinate and may experience problems with 
communication and organization resulting in low cohesion (Eisenberg et al., 1998; 
Forbes and Milliken, 1999).  Table 1 shows that the average board size of the 
Foreigners-on-Boards sample is 9.7 executives, while it is 7.8 for the All-British-
Boards. 
NED% is the ratio of the number of non-executive directors to Board-size. 
Although, the general expectation is that the independent directors are an important part 
of an effective corporate board (Fama and Jensen,1983; Cadbury Report, 1992), the 
evidence that they are sufficient to positively impact on board practices is mixed (e.g., 
Franks et al., 2001; Lee et al., 2008). The boards of companies with overseas executives 
have on average nearly 53% of NEDs, while the companies without the overseas 
executives have only 47.6% of NEDs. 
CEO-tenure is defined as the natural logarithm of the number of years and months a 
CEO has been in a current post plus one. It can be expected that good managers stay 
longer in their post, therefore a positive relationship between tenure and the 
performance is expected. CEOs of the All-British-Boards companies on average stay in 
jobs 4.3 years, while those in Foreigners-on-Boards firms for only 3.58 years. 
We also define a variable CEO-on-boards which is equal to the number of boards of 
listed companies (outside his/her own company) a CEO sits on in a given reporting 
year. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) show that being busy outside his/her own firm 
damages CEO in his/her duties, therefore a negative coefficient on the variable is 
expected. It seems that, on average, the All-British-Boards companies have less busy 
CEOs than companies with overseas executives. The corresponding averages are 1.24 
and 1.53. 
Finally, we define a dummy CEO-Chair equal to one if a CEO is also a Chairman of 
the board and zero otherwise. Because the separation of the positions of board chairman 
and of CEO are recommended for British boards as a sign of good corporate governance 
practice (Cadbury Report 1992, Higgs 2003),  being a chair and CEO at the same time 
may be perceived as an excessive concentration of power and expected to be associated 
with bad firm performance. However, given that British boards seem reluctant to allow 
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the CEO-Chair duality, it may be that the fact that a given CEO is allowed to be the 
Chairman may indicate that he/she is particularly good. If this is the case, then a 
positive coefficient for CEO-Chair could be expected. In the whole sample there are 70 
companies which at some point have the same person being a Chair and CEO. 56 of 
these are in the All-British-Boards sample.   
  In addition to the above defined variables we use year and industry dummies. The 
industry dummies are defined using the BoardEx industry specification. There are 33 
industries in the sample. 
 
 
4. Regression analysis 
 
The data at hand takes the form of an unbalanced panel with characteristics common 
for corporate governance studies. That is, several board and firm characteristics used as 
the explanatory variables are not independent over time (e.g., board size does not 
change randomly).  Moreover, the cross sections of the panel are not independent (e.g., 
stock market performance can have ‘swings’). In addition, it is also typical for data of 
this type that there are substantial differences across companies but similarities within 
groups of companies (e.g., within sectors). Therefore, to ensure that the estimated 
coefficients and their standard errors are correct a panel regression estimation technique 
which corrects standard errors for autocorrelation, contemporaneous cross-sectional 
correlation and heteroskedasticity is needed.    We adopt the panel-corrected standard 
errors estimation method (PCSE) developed by Beck and Katz (1995). The PCSE is 
shown (Hoechle, 2007) to produce more robust standard errors than the commonly used 
feasible generalized least-squares method proposed by Parks (1967).24  
We start the analysis from regressing the performance (ROCE or Returns) on 
Dispersion (Dispersionsalary or Dispersiontotal-pay), controls, and the year and sector 
dummies. The controls are Firm-size, Leverage, Intangibles, Insiders, Board-size, 
NED%, CEO-tenure, CEO-chair, and CEO-on-boards. The results are presented in 
                                               
24 Test statistics strongly show that autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are present. We cannot 
formally test for cross-sectional serial correlation because the panel is unbalanced and has many cross-
sections (STATA does not cope with the calculations). However, panel fixed effect estimations corrected 
for  heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (random effects were rejected by the Hausman test) showed 
coefficients different from those estimated with PCSE, which indicates that there may be biased due to 
cross-section correlations not accounted for.  
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Table 2 Panel A.   The columns’ headings indicate which dependent variable (ROCE or 
Returns) and which dispersion measure (Dispersionsalary or Dispersiontotal-pay) are used.  
Each set of the regressions is supplemented with the Wald-chi and the R-squared 
statistics, as well as the number of observations.  
The coefficients estimated for the control variables show that, consistent with our 
expectations, Leverage is associated with poor firm performance and CEO tenure with 
good firm performance. The significant and negative sign of the coefficients estimated 
for CEO-on-boards suggests that the more a CEO is active outside his/her own 
company, the worse his/her own company’s financial performance, although this result 
does not hold for the regressions using Returns as the dependent variable. Intangibles 
also have statistical power in explaining firm performance. The association of Intangible 
with ROCE is quite strong (1% significant), while with Returns its statistical 
significance drops to 5% and 10%, but it is a bit surprising that the sign of the estimated 
coefficients is negative. There is some evidence (10% significant) that the ratio of 
shares owned by the management team, Insiders, negatively covaries with the stock 
market performance and much stronger evidence (5% and 1% significance) that the 
proportion of nonexecutive directors, NED%, is negatively associated with ROCE. The 
fact that the CEO is also a chair does not impact on financial performance, but it is 
positively related to stock market performance (1% significance).  
 
 
************** insert Table 2 *************** 
 
 
Table 2 Panel A clearly shows that Dispersion negatively covaries with 
performance. The results are stronger for Dispersionsalary than for Dispersiontotal-pay. The 
coefficients estimated for Dispersionsalary are bigger, in absolute terms, and more 
significant than coefficients estimated for Dispersiontotal-pay. The impact of negative 
Dispersion is also material. Looking at Dispersionsalary, its impact on ROCE is -0.175 
and on Returns is -0.032. This means that moving from zero Dispersionsalary to its mean 
value 0.154 reduces ROCE by 2.7% and shareholder returns by 0.5% on annual basis. 
Given that the average ROCE is 6.1% and the average shareholder return is -0.1% the 
decline is economically significant. Dispersiontotal-pay has a similar negative (marginal) 
impact on shareholder returns (-0.49%).  
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These results are further strengthened when the regressions are estimated on the sub-
sample of 546 companies with British nationality executives only (Table 2 Panel B). 
The coefficients estimated for Dispersion are bigger and more statistically significant 
than those obtained for the whole sample. This strongly supports our hypothesis that in 
contrast with the American studies British boards are characterized by the negative 
dispersion-performance relationship. As in the case of when all companies are used in 
the estimations, it is also now that the impact of Dispersion is economically significant. 
Moving from zero Dispersionsalary to its mean (0.152) reduces ROCE by 4.4% and 
Returns by 0.97%. This is a material reduction given that the mean ROCE is 5.5% and 
the mean of Returns is -0.9%. Similar calculations show that Dispersiontotal-pay reduces 
ROCE by 2.8% and Returns by 0.74%. 
The coefficients estimated for the controls are mostly in line with those estimated 
for the whole sample, although, there are a few differences. For instance, in the All-
British-Boards sample the coefficients estimated for Board-size are statistically 
significant and negative in the ROCE regressions, the significance of the coefficients 
estimated for CEO-chair drops to 10% and 5%, and those estimated for CEO-on-boards 
lose their statistical significance. Also Leverage loses its statistical significance in 
explaining Returns. The significance of Intangibles drops to 10% in the regressions 
using Returns as the dependent variables, and disappear in the ROCE regressions.    
Given that the removal of the companies that have overseas executives strengthens 
the negative association of the remuneration dispersion with the firm performance, we 
run the regressions on the sample of 217 companies of the Foreigners-on-Boards 
sample. In addition, following from our hypothesis that American nationality executives 
may be associated with the positive dispersion-performance relationship we add the 
interactive term of Dispersion and the proportion of American executives, US-execs%, 
to the basic regression specification. The results are shown in Table 3. 
 
 
********************* insert Table 3 ***************** 
 
 
Table 3 shows that the coefficients estimated for the control variables have similar 
signs and significance to those estimated for the whole and the All-British-Boards 
samples (Table 2) safe for the coefficients estimated for NED%. In the Foreigners-on-
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Boards sample there is some evidence (mostly only 10% significant) that the proportion 
of nonexecutive directors positively covaries with the stock market performance.  
The biggest difference, however, is in the coefficients estimated for Dispersion. In 
contrast with the previous results the coefficients estimated for the Dispersion measures 
are statistically insignificant. Controlling for the proportion of American executives 
brings the significance back through the interactive term in the ROCE regressions, but 
this time the coefficient is positive (Table 3 Panel B). This is an indication of the 
potential support for our hypothesis that American executives are associated with the 
positive dispersion-performance relationship, but more careful analysis is needed. This 
is because some boards that have American executives also have other nationality 
executives, so the effect we observe may be cumulative rather than American driven. 
Moreover, it is possible that the impact of non-CEO executives and CEOs themselves 
has a different magnitude. For instance, let us imagine a situation that there is only one 
American nationality executive. The impact of this executive on how a company is run 
and performs may be much stronger if this person is a CEO than if he/she is one of 
many non-CEO executives. Therefore, to gain a better insight into the dispersion-
performance relationship the rest of the analysis is done separately for non-CEO 
executives and CEOs.  We start from the analysis of non-CEO executives (Table 4). The 
results obtained for the analysis of the impact of CEOs are presented in Tables 5 and 6.  
 
 
4.1. American nationality non-CEO executives 
 
As mentioned above it may be important to separate the impact of American and 
non-American board members. To do so, we return to the whole sample and remove 
from it all the boards that have both American and non-American overseas non-CEO 
executive members. There are 20 companies in this category. Using this smaller sample 
we run the basic regression to which two interactive terms are added: (i) Dispersion 
times USboard%, and (ii) Dispersion times Non-US/UKboard%. These interactive 
terms allow to depict whether the presence of the American and of the non-American 
overseas executives affect the sign and significance of the Dispersion coefficient. The 
results of these regressions are presented in Table 4 Panel A.   
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****************  insert Table 4   **************** 
 
 
The next step is to recognize that although the boards are separated into those with 
American and those with non-American overseas non-CEO executives, there are still 
cases that American CEOs lead companies with non-American overseas boards and 
non-American overseas CEOs head boards with American executives on. Therefore, to 
avoid such situations we further reduce the sample by the 10 companies in which there 
are US-CEOs and non-U.S. overseas executives, or there are non-U.S. overseas CEOs 
with American executive board members. Using this reduced sample we run regressions 
with Dispersion x USboard%, and Dispersion x Non-US/UKboard% added to the basic 
regression specification. The results are presented in Table 4 Panel B. 
Restricting the sample preserves the results. The coefficients estimated for 
Dispersion are negative and significant at 1% in the Returns regressions and 5% in the 
ROCE regressions for Dispersionsalary. Also consistent with the results presented in 
Table 3 the coefficients estimated for Dispersion x USboard% are statistically 
significantly different from zero and positive for the ROCE regressions. Also, as with 
the previous results, no effect is depicted for the Returns regressions.    
  To test whether the effect we observe is driven by companies having exposure to 
the American business culture we run a series of regressions which control for the 
impact of listing in the U.S. and having sales in the U.S. To do so the interactive terms, 
Dispersion x US-listing and Dispersion x US-sales are added to every regression 
specification. Given that the results obtained for these regressions are practically 
identical, to save space only the regressions equivalent to those in Table 4 Panel B are 
presented. Table 4 Panel C shows that controlling for the exposure to the American 
business culture does not affect the results. Neither the sign nor the significance of the 
coefficients estimated for Dispersion change. Similarly, the sign of the coefficients 
estimated for Dispersion x USboard% remain positive and statistically significant in the 
ROCE regressions. Also as previously all the coefficients estimated for Dispersion x 
Non-US/UKboard% remain statistically insignificant. 
The effect of the presence of American non-CEO executives on ROCE is also 
economically significant. Moving from a position of having no American executives to 
a situation where there are 35.6% of American non-CEO executives sitting on a board 
(35.6% is the average number of American non-CEO executives in companies with 
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American non-CEO executives) increases ROCE by 3.2% (=0.577x0.154x0.356), where 
the effect of Dispersionsalary is -3.1% (= -0.201x0.154) leaving the net effect of 0.1%. In 
other words, if American executives consist of, at least, 30% of the executive board the 
dispersion-performance relationship becomes positive.  
The coefficient of Dispersiontotal-pay in the ROCE regression is not significant, 
although still negative. However, the coefficient estimated for Dispersiontotal-pay x 
USboard% is positive and statistical significant at 5%.  The marginal effect is 2.4%. 
  
 
4.2. American nationality CEOs 
 
The last two tables, Tables 5 and 6, report the impact of CEOs on the dispersion-
performance relationship.  Table 5 shows the results for when the significance of 
American nationality CEOs is investigated, and Table 6 when the significance of non-
American overseas CEOs is analyzed. The two groups are studied separately because 
companies with different board characteristics have to be removed to allow separation 
of US-CEO and non-US/UK-CEO effects.   
Table 5 starts from showing the results for the whole sample when the interactive 
term Dispersion x US-CEO is added to the basic regression specification (Panel A). We 
start from the whole sample to have a base for a direct comparison with the regressions 
testing the impact of non-US overseas CEOs (Table 6 Panel A).  The next four columns 
(Panel B) show the results of the same specification when all boards which have an 
American CEO and overseas non-CEO executives are removed. There are 29 such 
boards leaving only 8 boards with an American CEO and all British non-CEO 
executives. This is a small sample, but if there is any effect, it cannot be attributed to the 
other overseas executives. Finally, the last four columns show the results when the 
interactions of Dispersion with US-listed and US-sales are added to the regression 
specification.  
 
****************  insert Table 5   **************** 
 
As previously, the coefficients estimated for Dispersion are negative and significant 
at 1% for the Returns regressions and 10% for the ROCE regressions using 
Dispersionsalary. Interestingly, all the coefficients estimated for Dispersion x US-CEO 
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are positive and statistically significant at 1% in the Returns regressions. The interactive 
term coefficients are also bigger than coefficients estimated for Dispersion indicating 
that companies with American CEOs are characterized by a positive dispersion-
performance relationship.  
As in the regressions presented in Table 4 Panel C nearly all the coefficients 
estimated for the interaction of Dispersion with US-listed and US-sales are statistically 
insignificant. Only one out of eight coefficients estimated for the interactive terms is 
statistically significant at 10%.   
 
****************  insert Table 6   **************** 
 
Finally, Table 6 presents the results analogous to those presented in Table 5 but for 
the non-US overseas CEOs. The first four columns show the results obtained for the 
whole sample and the last eight ones for the sample for which all boards with a non-US 
overseas CEO and at least one overseas non-CEO executive are removed. There are 33 
such cases leaving 37 non-US foreign CEOs running boards with only British 
nationality executives. These regressions should be treated more as a test of robustness 
of the Dispersion coefficients than tests of the sign and significance of the Dispersion x 
non-US/UK-CEO interaction. Given that there are many nationalities mixed up together 
in non-US/UK-CEO, it is hard to predict what the cumulative effect of these 
nationalities should be. However, it should be expected that whatever cutting of the 
sample is done, the coefficients estimated for Dispersion remain negative and 
significant.  
As in the previous regression specifications, also this time the Dispersion 
coefficients are negative and highly significant for the Returns regressions. Also the 
coefficients estimated for Dispersionsalary in the ROCE regressions remain statistically 
significant at 10%. However, this time all the coefficients, but two, estimated for the 
Dispersion x non-US/UK-CEO interactive terms are statistically insignificant. 
Moreover, there is only weak evidence (10%) that having sales in the U.S. is associated 
with the reduction of the negative dispersion-performance relationship.   
In the light of these results we conclude that, consistent with our expectations, the 
presence of American executives is associated with a positive impact on the dispersion-
performance relationship.   It appears that the positive impact characterizes both CEOs 
and non-CEO executives. Controlling for companies being listed in the U.S. and having 
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sales in the U.S. preserves the main results, i.e., Dispersion is negatively associated with 
firm performance. This means that having business contacts with the U.S. does not 
explain the positive association of the presence of American nationality executives with 
firm performance, although it may be further enhancing it. 
 
 
4.3. Is it really Americans that matter?  
 
We have just shown that cross-listing and having sales in the U.S. does not affect 
the impact of Dispersion on ROCE and Returns. Still, one could ask whether this is 
American nationality executives who affect how boards respond to the size of 
Dispersion, or whether American nationality executives are simply attracted to 
companies with higher dispersion (dispersion might be one of many characteristics of 
firm specific business culture). From the perspective of this research it does not really 
matter which of these explanations is more likely to hold because for as long as British 
boards are associated with the negative dispersion-performance relationship, the results 
show that the findings on American data do not have a universal character and 
accounting for differences in perceptions of remuneration practices and structures at the 
executive board level may be more important than has been acknowledged.  
However, the question of causality is interesting and it would be valuable to shed 
some light on the issue. There is not enough data to test for business culture 
characteristics of individual firms, and whether they change when particular individuals 
join or leave an executive board, so we look whether and how Dispersion changes when 
American nationality executives join a board. To do so we focus on companies which 
appoint an American nationality CEO and compare them against those companies 
which appoint a British nationality CEO. We single out CEOs since it can be expected 
that CEOs have more impact on boards and companies than individual non-CEO 
executives.  
There are 41 American nationality CEOs in the sample, however, for only 20 of 
them there is data about remuneration before the CEO was appointed, and the previous 
CEO was not of American nationality. For each of these CEOs we calculate the change 
in Dispersionsalary and the change in Dispersiontotal-pay as the differences between the 
corresponding Dispersions when an American nationality CEO is appointed and 
Dispersion a year before the appointment takes place (these are denoted 
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Dispersionsalary and Dispersiontotal-pay respectively). To account for the fact that if 
changes occur they may not be instantaneous we also calculate the difference in 
Dispersions when the American nationality CEO is in job for over a year and the pre-
appointment Dispersion. The sample size drops to 12 observations. The change in 
Dispersion is denoted 2Dispersion. 
The All-British-Boards companies for which information about remuneration prior 
to appointing a new CEO is available are used as a benchmark. There are 211 
companies in this group. The sample reduces to 123 companies when it is requested that 
the CEO stays in the job for the next year and remuneration information about this year 
is also available.  Using these samples Dispersion and 2Dispersion for salary and 
total pay are calculated.    
Table 7 provides the results of one-side t-tests for the sample means of the American 
and of the British CEOs, as well as for their differences. In spite of the small sample 
size the mean of Dispersiontotal-pay and  Dispersionsalary and Dispersiontotal-pay  are 
statistically significantly greater than zero. The 2Dispersions are statistically 
significantly greater than zero at 10%, which is still considerably high given that it is 
calculated on the sample of 12 observations.  
 
************** insert Table 7 here ************* 
 
The corresponding statistics calculated for the sample of UK nationality CEOs are 
less consistent. There is a statistically significant increase in Dispersiontotal-pay but there 
is no statistical increase when Dispersion a year after the appointment is compared 
against Dispersion before the appointment. In fact, there seems to be a small decline in 
Dispersionsalary (10% significant).  
The comparison of the differences of the means shows statistically significantly 
smaller change in Dispersion in the sample of British CEOs than in the sample of 
American CEOs. The 2Dispersionsalary just misses the 5% significance level.  
To close the discussion, the levels of Dispersions before the appointments of new 
CEOs are compared. The last two rows of Table 7 show that there is no statistical 
difference between Dispersions calculated for the companies appointing British CEOs 
and the companies appointing American CEOs in years preceding the appointments.  
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These results suggest that there may be some changes in how companies remunerate 
boards when American CEOs are appointed in comparison with companies that remain 
‘British’. There also seems to be no statistical evidence that the American CEOs are 
appointed by companies with statistically large Dispersion as compared against 
companies which appoint British CEOs.  Although more research is needed to 
understand what affects remuneration practices in companies, the evidence shown 
suggests that the presence of American CEOs may be a significant factor. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper the impact of remuneration dispersion of executive boards on firm 
performance is investigated using a big sample of British companies. The relationship 
between pay dispersion and firm performance is studied to answer the question to what 
extent findings on American data hold for British boards.  We provide several 
arguments why they might not. Consistent with our expectations we find that the 
dispersion-performance relationship has an opposite sign to that documented for boards 
of American firms. That is, big pay differences have a negative impact on performance. 
However, we also find that the dispersion-performance relationship is positive on those 
British boards which have American nationality CEOs. Also having 30% or more 
American nationality non-CEO executives is associated with the positive dispersion-
performance relationship. These results are robust for controlling for various firm, board 
and CEO characteristics, including cross-listing on American exchanges and having 
sales in the U.S.  
We also show that there is some evidence that indeed it may be the presence of 
American nationals that leads to the switch from the negative to the positive sign of the 
dispersion-performance relationship. The data are limited, but there is some evidence 
that remuneration dispersion changes more on boards that appointed an American CEO 
in comparison with those boards which appointed a British CEO.  
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. It documents the 
complexity of the relationship between remuneration practices and firm performance at 
the executive board level. It shows that findings on American data may not have a 
universal character. The fact that British boards, which in the universe of corporate 
governance structures and regimes are commonly identified as close to the American 
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ones, are characterized by a dispersion-performance relationship opposite to the one 
documented on American data shows that care is needed in any generalization of the 
American findings. This paper also has implications for the research on benefits and 
costs of board diversity. It adds a new dimension to the complex task of finding optimal 
financial incentives to culturally diverse boards.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the total sample of 781 companies (Panel A), for the All-British Boards sample of 564 companies (Panel B) and for the Foreigners-on-Boards sample of 217 companies (Panel C). 
   Panel A  Panel B  Panel C 
 Mean    Min  Max  Mean    Min  Max  Mean    Min  Max 
Control variables                     
Firm-size 12.27  2.119  3.09  18.99  11.892  1.986  3.09  17.67  13.36  2.123  5.503  18.99 
Leverage 0.224  0.164  0.001   0.953  0.220  0.164  0.001  0.953  0.235  0.162  0.001  0.924 
Intangibles 0.191  0.208  0  0.887  0.186  0.215  0  0.887  0.224  0.193  0  0.853 
Insiders 0.254  0.216  0.00  0.980  0.266  0.217  0.00  0.94  0.209  0.208  0.001  0.979 
Board-size 8.305  2.330  3  20  7.819  2.019  3  16  9.715  2.570  5  20 
NED% 0.490  0.118  0.00  0.823  0.476  0.117  0  0.786  0.529  0.113  0.200  0.823 
CEO-tenure 1.630  0.750  0  3.728  1.670  0.762  0  3.728  1.522  0.705  0  3.342 
CEO-chair 0.056  0.234  0  1  0.064  0.248  0  1  0.037  0.189  0  1 
CEO-on-boards 1.316  0.658  1  6  1.242  0.560  1  6  1.534  0.884  1  6 
Independent variables                       
Dispersionsalary  0.154  0.078  0  0.816  0.152  0.078  0  0.816  0.157  0.076  0  0.573 
Dispersiontotal pay 0.168  0.093  0  0.754  0.164  0.090  0  0.694  0.181  0.101  0.013  0.754 
USexecs% 0.038  0.107  0  0.833          0.150  0.168  0  0.833 
nonUS/UKexecs% 0.050  0.139  0  0.800          0.184  0.203  0  0.800 
USboard% 0.038  0.106  0  0.833          0.142  0.200  0  1 
nonUS/UKboard% 0.050  0.139  0  1          0.166  0.224  0  1 
US-CEO 0.043  0.204  0  1          0.171  0.376  0  1 
nonUS/UK-CEO 0.066  0.248  0  1          0.249  0.433  0  1 
US-sales 0.120  0.325  0  1  0.070  0.254  0  1  0.264  0.441  0  1 
US-listed 0.273  0.446  0  1  0.238  0.426  0  1  0.377  0.485  0  1 
Dependent variables                       
ROCE 0.062  0.212  -1.026  0.527  0.055  0.255  -1.026  0.527  0.782  0.188  -1.025  0.527 
Returns -0.001  0.046  -0.331  0.204  -0.001  0.046  -0.331  0.204  -0.001  0.045  -0.286  0.124 
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Table 2: Regression results with ROCE or Returns as the dependent variables testing the Dispersion-Performance relationship. Panel A shows the results for the basic regression 
specification using the whole sample; Panel B shows the results of the regressions for the All-British Boards sample. Dispersion refers to Dispersionsalary or Dispersiontotal pay as indicated in 
the headings of the columns;   p-values are shown in parenthesis. *p <  0.10, **p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  Panel A  Panel B 
Dispersionsalary  Dispersiontotal-pay  Dispersionsalary  Dispersiontotal-pay 
  ROCE  Returns  ROCE  Returns  ROCE  Returns  ROCE  Returns 
Firm-size 0.067***  0.001  0.067***  0.001  0.078***  0.000  0.078***  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.439)  (0.000)  (0.401)  (0.000)  (0.957)  (0.000)  (0.693) 
Leverage -0.290***  -0.011**  -0.297***  -0.010*  -0.340***  -0.007  -0.334***  -0.008 
  (0.000)  (0.041)  (0.000)  (0.067)  (0.000)  (0.302)  (0.000)  (0.235) 
Intangibles  -0.100**  -0.012**  -0.105**  -0.012**  -0.046  -0.012*  -0.050  -0.012* 
  (0.024)  (0.026)  (0.016)  (0.031)  (0.411)  (0.082)  (0.377)  (0.090) 
Insiders  0.034  -0.009*  0.038  -0.009*  0.047  -0.006  0.052  -0.008 
  (0.285)  (0.056)  (0.236)  (0.053)  (0.227)  (0.320)  (0.202)  (0.244) 
Board-size  -0.005  -0.000  -0.005  0.000  -0.008**  0.000  -0.006*  0.000 
  (0.203)  (0.899)  (0.263)  (0.967)  (0.040)  (0.702)  (0.076)  (0.816) 
NED% -0.152**  0.010  -0.158***  0.010  -0.222***  -0.001  -0.231***  -0.002 
  (0.011)  (0.216)  (0.008)  (0.214)  (0.000)  (0.932)  (0.000)  (0.837) 
CEO-tenure  0.035***  0.004***  0.036***  0.004***  0.035***  0.005***  0.035***  0.005*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
CEO-chair -0.008  0.009***  -0.011  0.009***  -0.013  0.008*  -0.013  0.009** 
  (0.726)  (0.008)  (0.655)  (0.005)  (0.597)  (0.053)  (0.589)  (0.037) 
CEO-on-boards -0.021***  -0.000  -0.020***  -0.001  -0.012  -0.000  -0.012  -0.000 
  (0.003)  (0.632)  (0.004)  (0.534)  (0.174)  (0.981)  (0.141)  (0.813) 
Dispersion  -0.175*  -0.032***  -0.076  -0.029***  -0.287**  -0.060***  -0.167**  -0.044*** 
  (0.065)  (0.006)  (0.216)  (0.002)  (0.014)  (0.000)  (0.033)  (0.001) 
Ch-2(45)  1287.8  1130.3  1295.7  1122.4  1040.7  832.8  1017.1  802.8 
R-squared  0.314  0.323  0.311  0.323  0.370  0.340  0.367  0.335 
Observations  2241  2221  2242  2222  1528  1511  1528  1511 
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Table 3: Regression results with ROCE or Returns as the dependent variables testing the Dispersion-Performance relationship on the sample of companies with overseas executives 
(Foreigners-on-Boards sample). Panel A shows the results for the basic regression specification; Panel B shows the results of the regressions testing the impact   of the presence of 
American nationality executives on Dispersion-Performance relationship. Dispersion refers to Dispersionsalary or Dispersiontotal pay as indicated in the headings of the columns;   p-values are 
shown in parenthesis. *p <  0.10, **p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
  Panel A  Panel B 
Dispersionsalary  Dispersiontotal-pay  Dispersionsalary  Dispersiontotal-pay 
  ROCE  Returns  ROCE  Returns  ROCE  Returns  ROCE  Returns 
Firm-size 0.043***  -0.000  0.043***  -0.000  0.042***  -0.000  0.043***  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.882)  (0.000)  (0.906)  (0.000)  (0.778)  (0.000)  (0.828) 
Leverage -0.197*  -0.015  -0.204*  -0.015  -0.233**  -0.016  -0.218**  -0.016 
  (0.069)  (0.144)  (0.063)  (0.144)  (0.029)  (0.131)  (0.040)  (0.126) 
Intangibles  -0.112  -0.015*  -0.102  -0.015*  -0.123  -0.015*  -0.108  -0.014* 
  (0.205)  (0.050)  (0.266)  (0.058)  (0.146)  (0.055)  (0.213)  (0.069) 
Insiders  0.038  -0.026***  0.037  -0.026***  0.040  -0.026***  0.045  -0.026*** 
  (0.409)  (0.001)  (0.430)  (0.001)  (0.379)  (0.001)  (0.335)  (0.001) 
Board-size  0.000  -0.001  0.001  -0.001  0.001  -0.001  0.001  -0.001 
  (0.972)  (0.316)  (0.924)  (0.264)  (0.845)  (0.368)  (0.906)  (0.288) 
NED% 0.066  0.024*  0.056  0.026*  0.074  0.025*  0.053  0.026** 
  (0.552)  (0.066)  (0.635)  (0.052)  (0.501)  (0.063)  (0.646)  (0.048) 
CEO-tenure  0.046***  0.003*  0.045***  0.003*  0.044***  0.003*  0.046***  0.003* 
  (0.001)  (0.063)  (0.001)  (0.069)  (0.001)  (0.051)  (0.001)  (0.059) 
CEO-chair 0.025  0.013**  0.029  0.012**  0.009  0.012**  0.020  0.012** 
  (0.663)  (0.022)  (0.609)  (0.027)  (0.878)  (0.033)  (0.720)  (0.032) 
CEO-on-boards -0.018*  0.001  -0.019*  0.001  -0.021**  0.001  -0.020*  0.001 
  (0.091)  (0.405)  (0.061)  (0.423)  (0.046)  (0.490)  (0.053)  (0.465) 
Dispersion  -0.137  0.019  0.041  0.005  -0.254  0.015  -0.061  0.002 
  (0.506)  (0.270)  (0.688)  (0.694)  (0.277)  (0.400)  (0.643)  (0.908) 
Dispersion x 
US-execs%          1.044**  0.035  0.575*  0.024 
          (0.015)  (0.344)  (0.053)  (0.463) 
Ch-2(45)  562.0  415.3  552.8  419.0  617.5  417.8  583.8  419.9 
R-squared  0.253  0.351  0.254  0.350  0.263  0.352  0.259  0.351 
Observations  757  757  757  757  756  756  756  756 
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Table 4. Regression results with ROCE or Returns as the dependent variables testing impact of an American nationality non-CEO executives (USboard%) and of non-American overseas nationality non-CEO executives (non-US/UKboard%) on the Dispersion-
Performance relationship. Panel A shows the results for the sample without boards which have both  American nationality non-CEO executives and  non-American overseas nationality non-CEO executives; Panel B shows the results when also boards  with American 
nationality CEOs and non-American overseas executives, as well as boards with non-American overseas CEOs and American non-CEO executives are removed; Panel C shows the estimates obtained for the sample used in Panel B with the regressions specifications 
expanded for the interactive terms of Dispersion x US-listed and Dispersion x US-sales. Dispersion refers to Dispersionsalary or Dispersiontotal pay as indicated in the headings of the columns;   p-values are shown in parenthesis. *p <  0.10, **p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 Panel A  Panel B  Panel C 
Dispersionsalary  Dispersiontotal-pay  Dispersionsalary  Dispersiontotal-pay  Dispersionsalary  Dispersiontotal-pay 
 ROCE  Returns  ROCE  Returns  ROCE  Returns  ROCE  Returns  ROCE  Returns  ROCE  Returns 
Firm-size 0.068***  0.001  0.068***  0.001  0.069***  0.000  0.069***  0.001  0.072***  0.001  0.071***  0.001 
 (0.000)  (0.467)  (0.000)  (0.437)  (0.000)  (0.510)  (0.000)  (0.459)  (0.000)  (0.353)  (0.000)  (0.395) 
Leverage -0.334***  -0.010*  -0.340***  -0.009  -0.339***  -0.011*  -0.345***  -0.010*  -0.335***  -0.011*  -0.334***  -0.010* 
 (0.000)  (0.073)  (0.000)  (0.104)  (0.000)  (0.061)  (0.000)  (0.088)  (0.000)  (0.051)  (0.000)  (0.093) 
Intangibles -0.096**  -0.013**  -0.100**  -0.013**  -0.094**  -0.013**  -0.097**  -0.013**  -0.094**  -0.014**  -0.098**  -0.013** 
 (0.032)  (0.018)  (0.024)  (0.021)  (0.042)  (0.018)  (0.033)  (0.020)  (0.041)  (0.015)  (0.035)  (0.022) 
Insiders  0.017  -0.009*  0.017  -0.009*  0.019  -0.009*  0.019  -0.009*  0.023  -0.009*  0.025  -0.009* 
 (0.554)  (0.076)  (0.578)  (0.069)  (0.519)  (0.074)  (0.527)  (0.068)  (0.458)  (0.070)  (0.432)  (0.064) 
Board-size -0.011***  0.000  -0.010***  0.000  -0.011***  0.000  -0.010***  0.000  -0.011***  0.000  -0.011***  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.984)  (0.000)  (0.882)  (0.000)  (0.951)  (0.000)  (0.860)  (0.000)  (0.855)  (0.000)  (0.811) 
NED% -0.118**  0.010  -0.125**  0.010  -0.123**  0.009  -0.131**  0.009  -0.116**  0.010  -0.118**  0.010 
 (0.040)  (0.227)  (0.029)  (0.211)  (0.032)  (0.264)  (0.023)  (0.247)  (0.037)  (0.197)  (0.035)  (0.207) 
CEO-tenure  0.036***  0.004***  0.036***  0.004***  0.036***  0.004***  0.036***  0.004***  0.035***  0.004***  0.034***  0.004*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
CEO-chair -0.002  0.009***  -0.005  0.009***  -0.002  0.009***  -0.005  0.009***  -0.001  0.010***  -0.002  0.009*** 
 (0.934)  (0.008)  (0.835)  (0.006)  (0.920)  (0.008)  (0.819)  (0.006)  (0.968)  (0.005)  (0.923)  (0.006) 
CEO-on-boards -0.023***  -0.001  -0.020***  -0.001  -0.023***  -0.001  -0.021***  -0.001  -0.022***  -0.001  -0.022***  -0.001 
 (0.003)  (0.348)  (0.007)  (0.277)  (0.002)  (0.452)  (0.006)  (0.397)  (0.005)  (0.405)  (0.005)  (0.323) 
Dispersion -0.193**  -0.034***  -0.107*  -0.030***  -0.194**  -0.035***  -0.104  -0.030***  -0.201**  -0.029**  -0.103  -0.030*** 
 (0.045)  (0.004)  (0.097)  (0.002)  (0.043)  (0.003)  (0.108)  (0.002)  (0.043)  (0.011)  (0.130)  (0.003) 
Dispersion x USboard% 0.499*  -0.014  0.368**  -0.019  0.528*  -0.019  0.407**  -0.030  0.577**  -0.015  0.395**  -0.027 
 (0.057)  (0.670)  (0.024)  (0.370)  (0.059)  (0.576)  (0.032)  (0.152)  (0.038)  (0.640)  (0.042)  (0.231) 
Dispersion x Non-US/UK 
board% 
0.122  0.032  0.241  0.032  0.152  0.018  0.313  0.020  0.168  0.018  0.354  0.022 
(0.659)  (0.307)  (0.244)  (0.260)  (0.596)  (0.562)  (0.147)  (0.486)  (0.559)  (0.579)  (0.125)  (0.444) 
Dispersion x US-listed                 -0.408  -0.038  -0.319*  -0.019 
                 (0.162)  (0.125)  (0.090)  (0.260) 
Dispersion x US-sales                 0.228*  0.017  0.167  0.016 
                 (0.061)  (0.195)  (0.112)  (0.151) 
Ch-2(45) 1244.7  1109.2  1232.3  1104.6  1231.1  1100.9  1230.8  1098.1  1167.4  1108.4  1113.0  1109.0 
R-squared 0.331  0.323  0.324  0.323  0.331  0.324  0.325  0.324  0.334  0.326  0.321  0.325 
Observations 2195  2175  2196  2176  2175  2155  2176  2156  2175  2155  2176  2156 
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Table 5. Regression results with ROCE or Returns as the dependent variables testing impact of an American nationality CEO (US-CEO) on the Dispersion-Performance relationship. Panel A shows results for the whole sample; Panel B shows results when US-CEO 
head boards consisting of British nationality executives only; Panel C shows the estimates obtained for the sample used in Panel B with the regressions specifications expanded for the interactive terms of Dispersion x US-listed and Dispersion x US-sales. Dispersion 
refers to Dispersionsalary or Dispersiontotal pay as indicated in the headings of the columns;   p-values are shown in parenthesis. *p <  0.10, **p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 Panel A  Panel B  Panel C 
Dispersionsalary  Dispersiontotal-pay  Dispersionsalary  Dispersiontotal-pay  Dispersionsalary  Dispersiontotal-pay 
 ROCE  Returns  ROCE  Returns  ROCE  Returns  ROCE  Returns  ROCE  Returns  ROCE  Returns 
Firm-size 0.067***  0.000  0.067***  0.000  0.068***  0.000  0.068***  0.000  0.071***  0.001  0.070***  0.001 
 (0.000)  (0.719)  (0.000)  (0.609)  (0.000)  (0.682)  (0.000)  (0.536)  (0.000)  (0.440)  (0.000)  (0.448) 
Leverage -0.290***  -0.012**  -0.297***  -0.011*  -0.291***  -0.011*  -0.294***  -0.010*  -0.287***  -0.011**  -0.286***  -0.009* 
 (0.000)  (0.036)  (0.000)  (0.057)  (0.000)  (0.060)  (0.000)  (0.087)  (0.000)  (0.046)  (0.000)  (0.093) 
Intangibles -0.099**  -0.012**  -0.105**  -0.011**  -0.093**  -0.011**  -0.098**  -0.010*  -0.092**  -0.012**  -0.098**  -0.010* 
 (0.028)  (0.030)  (0.016)  (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.043)  (0.025)  (0.056)  (0.042)  (0.032)  (0.025)  (0.057) 
Insiders  0.035  -0.010**  0.039  -0.010**  0.039  -0.009*  0.042  -0.009*  0.042  -0.009*  0.048  -0.009* 
 (0.271)  (0.044)  (0.234)  (0.042)  (0.249)  (0.082)  (0.225)  (0.081)  (0.211)  (0.076)  (0.165)  (0.080) 
Board-size -0.005  -0.000  -0.005  0.000  -0.005  -0.000  -0.004  -0.000  -0.005  -0.000  -0.005  0.000 
 (0.206)  (1.000)  (0.268)  (0.902)  (0.220)  (0.839)  (0.303)  (0.963)  (0.212)  (0.996)  (0.251)  (0.989) 
NED% -0.154***  0.009  -0.157***  0.009  -0.161***  0.009  -0.169***  0.009  -0.154***  0.010  -0.160***  0.010 
 (0.010)  (0.262)  (0.008)  (0.241)  (0.006)  (0.275)  (0.005)  (0.257)  (0.008)  (0.209)  (0.006)  (0.208) 
CEO-tenure  0.036***  0.004***  0.036***  0.004***  0.036***  0.004***  0.037***  0.004***  0.035***  0.004***  0.036***  0.004*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
CEO-chair -0.010  0.010***  -0.011  0.010***  -0.009  0.009**  -0.011  0.009***  -0.009  0.009**  -0.011  0.009*** 
 (0.689)  (0.008)  (0.657)  (0.005)  (0.689)  (0.011)  (0.657)  (0.006)  (0.714)  (0.013)  (0.651)  (0.006) 
CEO-on-boards -0.021***  -0.000  -0.020***  -0.000  -0.023***  0.001  -0.022***  0.000  -0.023***  0.000  -0.024***  0.000 
 (0.003)  (0.863)  (0.004)  (0.711)  (0.001)  (0.550)  (0.002)  (0.796)  (0.002)  (0.624)  (0.001)  (0.959) 
Dispersion -0.173*  -0.035***  -0.069  -0.032***  -0.174*  -0.037***  -0.060  -0.034***  -0.187*  -0.033***  -0.070  -0.033*** 
 (0.071)  (0.002)  (0.280)  (0.001)  (0.070)  (0.002)  (0.350)  (0.000)  (0.057)  (0.004)  (0.308)  (0.001) 
Dispersion x US-CEO -0.038  0.057***  -0.081  0.037***  -0.111  0.068***  -0.066  0.039***  -0.047  0.068***  -0.089  0.037** 
 (0.763)  (0.000)  (0.353)  (0.005)  (0.403)  (0.001)  (0.444)  (0.010)  (0.733)  (0.001)  (0.284)  (0.018) 
Dispersion x US-listed                 -0.366  -0.036  -0.259  -0.017 
                 (0.171)  (0.101)  (0.126)  (0.270) 
Dispersion x US-sales                 0.227*  0.006  0.133  0.013 
                 (0.064)  (0.630)  (0.194)  (0.215) 
Ch-2(45) 1277.5  1143.5  1288.7  1121.4  1240.8  1131.4  1242.5  1109.3  1229.8  1136.0  1223.5  1121.7 
R-squared 0.314  0.326  0.311  0.324  0.315  0.327  0.310  0.325  0.318  0.329  0.311  0.326 
Observations 2241  2221  2242  2222  2209  2189  2210  2190  2209  2189  2210  2190 
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Table 6. Regression results with ROCE or Returns as the dependent variables testing impact of  non-American overseas  nationality CEO (Nnon-US/UK-CEO) on the Dispersion-Performance relationship. Panel A shows results for the whole sample; Panel B shows 
results when Non-US/UK-CEO head boards consisting of British nationality executives only; Panel C shows the estimates obtained for the sample used in Panel B with the regressions specifications expanded for the interactive terms of Dispersion x US-listed and 
Dispersion x US-sales. Dispersion refers to Dispersionsalary or Dispersiontotal pay as indicated in the headings of the columns;   p-values are shown in parenthesis. *p <  0.10, **p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 Panel A  Panel B  Panel C 
Dispersionsalary  Dispersiontotal-pay  Dispersionsalary  Dispersiontotal-pay  Dispersionsalary  Dispersiontotal-pay 
 ROCE  Returns  ROCE  Returns  ROCE  Returns  ROCE  Returns  ROCE  Returns  ROCE  Returns 
Firm-size 0.067***  0.000  0.067***  0.001  0.066***  0.000  0.066***  0.000  0.069***  0.001  0.068***  0.001 
 (0.000)  (0.486)  (0.000)  (0.424)  (0.000)  (0.558)  (0.000)  (0.499)  (0.000)  (0.380)  (0.000)  (0.393) 
Leverage -0.288***  -0.011**  -0.295***  -0.010*  -0.294***  -0.013**  -0.300***  -0.011**  -0.296***  -0.013**  -0.297***  -0.011** 
 (0.000)  (0.040)  (0.000)  (0.065)  (0.000)  (0.026)  (0.000)  (0.044)  (0.000)  (0.021)  (0.000)  (0.048) 
Intangibles -0.104**  -0.012**  -0.107**  -0.012**  -0.107**  -0.013**  -0.111**  -0.012**  -0.103**  -0.014**  -0.110**  -0.013** 
 (0.019)  (0.023)  (0.013)  (0.029)  (0.021)  (0.017)  (0.013)  (0.023)  (0.025)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.025) 
Insiders  0.032  -0.010*  0.039  -0.010**  0.029  -0.009*  0.037  -0.009*  0.038  -0.009*  0.041  -0.009* 
 (0.310)  (0.051)  (0.224)  (0.050)  (0.357)  (0.075)  (0.272)  (0.072)  (0.228)  (0.067)  (0.215)  (0.069) 
Board-size -0.006  -0.000  -0.005  -0.000  -0.005  0.000  -0.004  0.000  -0.005  0.000  -0.005  0.000 
 (0.171)  (0.807)  (0.230)  (0.918)  (0.213)  (0.999)  (0.307)  (0.909)  (0.229)  (0.957)  (0.271)  (0.878) 
NED% -0.156***  0.009  -0.164***  0.009  -0.164***  0.009  -0.166***  0.009  -0.152**  0.010  -0.155***  0.010 
 (0.009)  (0.268)  (0.005)  (0.252)  (0.007)  (0.279)  (0.006)  (0.254)  (0.011)  (0.201)  (0.009)  (0.208) 
CEO-tenure  0.036***  0.004***  0.036***  0.004***  0.037***  0.004***  0.037***  0.004***  0.035***  0.004***  0.036***  0.004*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
CEO-chair -0.008  0.009***  -0.013  0.009***  -0.011  0.009**  -0.015  0.009***  -0.010  0.010***  -0.015  0.009*** 
 (0.743)  (0.008)  (0.586)  (0.006)  (0.640)  (0.012)  (0.553)  (0.009)  (0.685)  (0.006)  (0.562)  (0.010) 
CEO-on-boards -0.018**  -0.000  -0.018***  -0.001  -0.017**  -0.000  -0.018**  -0.001  -0.018**  -0.000  -0.019**  -0.001 
 (0.011)  (0.675)  (0.010)  (0.535)  (0.021)  (0.719)  (0.018)  (0.569)  (0.019)  (0.708)  (0.012)  (0.553) 
Dispersion -0.184*  -0.034***  -0.088  -0.031***  -0.177*  -0.035***  -0.088  -0.032***  -0.190*  -0.029**  -0.084  -0.032*** 
 (0.058)  (0.003)  (0.166)  (0.001)  (0.073)  (0.004)  (0.172)  (0.001)  (0.058)  (0.012)  (0.225)  (0.002) 
Dispersion x nonUS/UK-
CEO 
0.123  0.029**  0.103  0.021*  0.097  0.026  -0.031  0.014  0.060  0.025  -0.046  0.015 
(0.325)  (0.043)  (0.310)  (0.074)  (0.593)  (0.159)  (0.834)  (0.359)  (0.740)  (0.154)  (0.755)  (0.301) 
Dispersion x US-listed                 -0.405  -0.038  -0.328*  -0.023 
                 (0.146)  (0.128)  (0.062)  (0.186) 
Dispersion x US-sales                 0.216*  0.017  0.128  0.018* 
                 (0.082)  (0.176)  (0.230)  (0.097) 
Ch-2(45) 1300.5  1140.8  1322.5  1130.2  2246.3  14347.3  2266.9  14492.7  2160.0  14725.8  2228.5  14692.4 
R-squared 0.313  0.324  0.311  0.324  0.312  0.323  0.311  0.323  0.316  0.326  0.312  0.325 
Observations 2241  2221  2242  2222  2168  2147  2169  2148  2168  2147  2169  2148 
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Table 7. One-tailed tests for statistical significance of changes in Dispersion when new CEOs are 
 appointed.  
  Mean  T-statistic  Obs. 
US nationality CEOs       
Dispersionsalary  -0.010  -0.543  20 
Dispersiontotal-pay   0.086**  1.999  20 
2Dispersionsalary  0.038*  1.437  12 
2Dispersiontotal-pay  0.0498*  1.448  12 
       
UK nationality CEOs       
Dispersionsalary  0.008  1.034  212 
Dispersiontotal-pay   0.015**  1.654  212 
2Dispersionsalary  -0.010*  -1.370  123 
Dispersiontotal-pay  0.005  0.737  123 
         
Difference between UK nationality CEOs and US nationality CEOs 
 Dispersionsalary  0.018  0.898  232 
 Dispersiontotal-pay   -0.071*  -1.606  232 
2Dispersionsalary  -0.483*  -1.746  135 
2Dispersiontotal-pay  -0.044  -1.251  135 
Dispersionsalary  0.011  0.957  232 
Dispersiontotal-pay   0.011  0.660  232 
 
 
 
 
 
